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Abstract—Many security techniques working at the physical
layer need a correct channel state information (CSI) at the
transmitter, especially when devices are equipped with multiple
antennas. Therefore such techniques are vulnerable to pilot
contamination attacks (PCAs) by which an attacker aims at
inducing false CSI. In this paper we provide a solution to some
PCA methods, by letting two legitimate parties to compare their
channel estimates. The comparison is made in order to minimize
the information leakage on the channel to a possible attacker. By
reasonable assumptions on both the channel knowledge by the
attacker and the correlation properties of the attacker and legit-
imate channels we show the validity of our solution. An accurate
analysis of possible attacks and countermeasures is provided,
together with a numerical evaluation of the attainable secrecy
outage probability when our solution is used in conjunction with
beamforming for secret communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to enhance security in communication systems, it
has been recently proposed to operate at the physical layer
(see [1] and references therein for an overview). In particular,
since early Shannon works [2], is has been shown that, by
properly coding a message it is possible to perfectly recover
it at an intended receiver without leaking any information
on it to an eavesdropping device. The use of devices with
multiple antennas in what is called multiple-input-multiple-
output-multiple-eavesdropper (MIMOME) system, in general
increases the security capabilities. However full knowledge
of the legitimate channel (channel state information (CSI)) is
needed at the transmitter to exploit at best these potentials [3].
For example, if Alice beamforms the signal to the legitimate
receiver Bob, the eavesdropper Eve will (most likely) see a
poor channel, and therefore the resulting gap between the
signal to noise ratios (SNRs) at Bob and Eve will be large1.
In order to obtain CSI when channel reciprocity is available,
Bob can send pilot signals in a training phase and Alice will
estimate the channel. However, a pilot contamination attack
(PCA) has been outlined in the literature [3], [4], working as
follows. Pilot symbols are assumed publicly known; therefore
when Bob transmits pilots, Eve may transmit the same pilots
as well. The channel estimated by Alice will then be the sum
of the channels between Bob and Eve. Therefore, with this
S. Tomasin is also with University of Padova, Italy.
1Note that if the channel to Eve is known, perfect secrecy can be achieved.
When CSI to the eavesdropper is not available, its statistics may still be
available and then we can assess the probability that Eve obtains information
on the transmitted message.
attack, Eve is able to modify the channel estimate and obtain
a higher SNR after beamforming.
A number of solutions have been proposed in the literature
to detect PCA: in [5] it is proposed to reserve two slots for
training; in the second slot random pilots on a phase shift
keying (PSK) constellation are transmitted and the receiver can
detect the pilot contamination by correlating the received sig-
nals in the two phases and checking if the resulting correlated
signal belongs to a PSK constellation. The use of an additional
action after channel estimation, in which Alice beamforms a
pilot sequence to Bob such that the received signal at Bob
has predetermined average/statistical values is advocated in
[6]. If the estimated channel is not correct, the beamformer
will not correspond to the channel and the parameters of
the signal received by Bob will not have the values agreed
upon. In [7] a solution to the pilot contamination problem has
been proposed, under the hypothesis that the legitimate users
exactly know the correlation matrix of both the legitimate and
the eavesdropper channel, which may be unrealistic in many
application scenarios. In [8] it is proposed to detect unexpected
drops in the received signal strength due to the misaligned
beam direction. However, this approach requires a reference
SNR level in the absence of the attack, which is difficult to
obtain, especially when multiple legitimate users are present.
A method in [9] allows Alice to detect PCA, based on the fact
that she will observe a change in the statistics of training, i.e.,
an increase of the power of training, due to the transmission
by Eve. However, also in this case a good SNR reference value
is needed.
In this paper we propose a technique by which Alice
and Bob estimate the channel by exchanging pilot sequences
and then check if their estimates coincide. In order to avoid
disclosing the channel to Eve and to prevent Eve from forging
the message exchange, the comparison is not done publicly.
Instead, they extract secret keys (SKs) from the estimates
and then check if they coincide using a key confirmation
procedure. This protocol ensures that Eve gets the minimum
information on the channel from the information exchange.
We consider various scenarios for the channel knowledge by
Eve and for the correlation between legitimate’s and attacker’s
channels, assessing the validity of the proposed solution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we introduce the transmission scenario and we indicate
the baseline protocol for channel estimation. In Section III
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Fig. 1. Transmission scenario.
the proposed solution is described. An attack analysis under
different scenarios is proposed in Section IV. Numerical results
are reported in Section V, before conclusions are drawn in
Section VI.
Notation. Matrices and vectors are indicated in boldface.
XH denotes the Hermitian operator of matrix X , IN is the
N × N identity matrix. X−1 denotes the inverse of matrix
X . log denotes base-2 logarithm. det(X) is determinant of
matrix X .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
All users are transceivers equipped with N antennas (the
proposed methods can be straightforwardly extended to the
case in which users have different numbers of antennas)
and channels are assumed narrowband, time-invariant and
reciprocal. Let H be the N×N multiple-input-multiple-output
(MIMO) channel matrix of complex numbers describing the
channel between Alice and Bob, and let G1 and G2 be the
matrices of the Alice-Eve and Bob-Eve channels, respectively.
Alice and Bob know the noise power and the statistics of H .
Initially, we assume that no user knows the channel matri-
ces2. Alice aims at securely transmitting a message to Bob
[7] or at extracting a SK with him [8], [9]. To this end,
Alice estimates her channel to Bob H(A) and then performs
beamforming with matrix B to Bob’s antennas. Assuming that
Alice has no knowledge of her channel to Eve, the beamform-
ing procedure aims at reducing the secrecy outage probability
(SOP), i.e., the probability that Eve knows something about
the secret message or key. However, it is pivotal that Alice has
a correct CSI of the link to Bob, otherwise the beamforming
is not effective.
Baseline Channel Estimation Protocol: The baseline
channel estimation protocols provides that Bob sends pilot sig-
nals to Alice, who estimates the channel H(A) and performs
beamforming. In her transmission, Alice will also insert pilots,
so that Bob can estimate the channel including beamforming
and is able to decode the message.
A. Attacker Capabilities
The purpose of the attacker Eve is to obtain information on
the secret message or key, and in this respect she performs a
PCA in order to increase the SOP.
2Other assumptions on the channel knowledge by Eve will be considered
in Section IV.
We assume that Eve has unlimited transmit power and
computation capabilities, she is able to detect and intercept
any transmission between Alice and Bob, and she is able
to transmit signals in a synchronous manner with them.
Moreover, signaling and pilot signals used by Alice and Bob
are already known to Eve. Eve will exploit these capabilities
to corrupt the CSI obtained by Alice to perform beamforming,
so that the outage probability is increased. Various levels of
knowledge of the channels and their statistics can be assumed,
and a detailed analysis will be provided in Section IV.
Baseline Attack: A PCA strategy provides that Eve
transmits pilot signals together with Bob, so that the estimated
channel at Alice will be
H(A) = [H +G1] +w
(A) , (1)
where w(A) is the noise matrix of residual estimation error.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In order to prevent the PCA, we propose the protocol shown
in Fig. 2. It comprises two major steps: a) channel estimation,
b) channel comparison.
For the first step, two pilot transmission phases are provided:
first Alice transmits pilots to Bob, and then Bob transmits
pilots to Alice; the pilots are assumed to be publicly known.
Based on the received pilots, the two legitimate users estimate
the channel. In the second step, the two channel estimates are
compared: if they coincide (apart from the effect of the noise),
then Eve did not perform the baseline attack, while if they
differ, Eve was transmitting pilots during the second phase. In
fact, when Eve attacks with the baseline attack, she transmits
pilots in the second phase, and the two channel estimates will
differ. Note that if Eve transmits pilots also in the first phase,
the estimated channels at Alice and Bob will be
H(A) = [H +G1] +w
(A) , (2)
H(B) = [H +G2] +w
(B) (3)
and since G1 6= G2, the two channels will differ.
For a channel comparison, a first trivial solution to compare
the two estimates would be that Alice and Bob send the
estimates publicly on the wireless channel. However, this
would allow Eve to intercept the transmission and then know
the channel. Once Eve knows the true channel between Alice
and Bob, she can perform a PCA in which she precodes the
pilots such that both Alice and Bob estimate channel G1, thus
getting full access to forthcoming transmission. This attack is
detailed in Section IV-C.
Improved Channel Comparison: In order to check the
consistency of the two channels without revealing them to Eve,
Alice and Bob independently extract a SK from the estimated
channels (see [10] for details on the SK extraction procedure).
By this technique they obtain a bit sequence (key) from the
channel estimates. Denote a the key generated by Alice and b
the key generated by Bob. Let M be the length of the extracted
keys (in number of bits).
If no attack is present, the two bit sequences are identical
despite noise that has affected the estimation (see [10], [11]
for details). In the presence of an attack that has modified the
channel in a way such that the change of the channel estimates
is above the noise level, the two bit sequences (keys) at
Alice and Bob will be different. Therefore a key confirmation
procedure is used to check if the two extracted keys coincide.
On The Number of Antennas: Note that as the number of
antennas at the transceivers increases (N → ∞), the channel
estimation phase will require more resources (time and en-
ergy). However a trade-off between performance and resource
utilization can be obtained when antennas are unbalanced
among the transceivers. For example, if Alice has a huge
number of antennas and Bob only a few, channel Estimation
by Alice is simpler than by Bob. In this case Bob sends pilots
to Alice, who in turns either selects a subset of antennas or
beamforms signals through the antennas and sends pilots to
let Bob estimate a reduced equivalent channel.
A. Key Confirmation Procedure
A vast literature on key confirmation procedure is available,
see for example [12]. In the following we present a possible
approach, summarized in Fig. 3. Alice generates a sequence
of M random bits, denoted by r, and xors them with the SK
(bit-wise modulo-two sum) to obtain x = a + r, i.e., Alice
performs a one-time-pad encoding of the random bits. The
encoded bits x are transmitted over the channel. Bob detects
these encoded bits and decrypts them using his extracted key
b, in order to obtain the random bit sequence generated by
Alice: r′ = x + b (modulo-two sum). Note that r = r′ if
a = b. Bob then maps the decrypted bits into another sequence
of M bits by applying an invertible non-identical function3
h(·) : FM2 → F
M
2 to obtain the mapped value h(r′). On this
mapped value Bob performs one time padding with his key
and sends the encrypted message to Alice: y = h(r′) + b.
Alice decrypts the message by removing the one-time pad,
z = y + a, and checks if the received message is the correct
mapped value of her randomly generated bits, i.e. checks if
h(r) = z. (4)
If the mapped value and z are identical (i.e., (4) holds true),
Alice concludes that there is no PCA, and pairing is successful.
A few facts are worth noting:
a) The condition for the check (4) is given by h(r) = h(x+
a) + b; therefore function h(·) must be non-identical.
b) When Alice and Bob estimate the same channel, the
extracted keys are the same and the whole procedure leads
to a successful pairing. If instead the keys extracted by Alice
and Bob do not correspond, the decryption by Bob will lead
to another message, thus to another mapped value, and the
pairing process will fail.
c) Eve does not learn the channel H during this process.
d) If Eve performs an attack in the phases following the
training phase, she does not get to know the SK and thus can
not break the pairing process.
3F2 is the binary Galois field.
Alice sends pilots and
Bob estimates the channel
Bob sends pilots and Alice
estimates the channel
Alice and Bob extract a SK
from their channel estimate
Are keys
extracted
by Alice
and Bob
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Pairing
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Pairing
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yesno
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the proposed solution.
B. Channel Reciprocity Issues
In the proposed solution the channel reciprocity between
Alice and Bob is very important. However, this is relevant
not only for the detection of pilot contamination but also
for the forthcoming use of the channel estimate by Alice,
i.e., beamforming secret messages to Bob. If the channel
is different due to hardware impairments, the channel that
will be used by Alice after the pairing process will be not
correct. In fact, she will beamform a signal to Bob using the
channel estimate, but if this is not correct, the signal will
not reach Bob, who will not be able to decode the secret
information. So the assumption that hardware impairments are
moderate is associated with the use of this estimate. When
we look specifically at robustness of our proposed solution to
(moderate) mismatches, we note that channel H is used to
extract the SK. Now, the SK extraction procedure, available
in existing literature includes the fact that Alice and Bob have
different estimates of the channel. Therefore, the solution can
be considered robust to hardware impairments. Impairments
still diminish the protection against attacks, since for a higher
noise (or impairments’) power, a smaller number of SK bits
can be extracted from the channel.
IV. ATTACK ANALYSIS
In this section we assess the robustness of the proposed
approach against various attack strategies, in particular distin-
guishing the level of knowledge about the channels that Eve
has.
For the analysis we focus on the case in which the number
of antennas N tends to infinity, i.e., a massive MIMO scenario.
Alice sends a random sequence
of bits encrypted with the SK
Bob decodes the random
sequence and processes it
with an invertible non-identity
publicly known function
Bob sends the new sequence
(mapped value) to Alice, by
encrypting it with his SK
Alice decodes the transmitted se-
quence and decrypts it with her SK
equal to
function of
original
sequence?
Pairing
succeeds
Pairing
fails
yesno
Fig. 3. Key confirmation procedure.
We also assume that the SK agreeing procedure is done
optimally, i.e., with capacity achieving strategies. Furthermore,
we assume that channels H , G1 and G2 have independent and
identically distributed (iid) zero-mean Gaussian entries.
We start assuming that Eve does not know a-priori channels
H , G1 and G2. Let us denote with σ2H the variance of each
entry of H , and let us assume that channel estimates are
affected by estimation noise (w(A) and w(B)) with power γ
per entry. Following the results of [13], we have that the SK
capacity is
C(ρ) = log
1
1− ρ2
, (5)
where
ρ =
E[H
(A)
i,j H
(B)∗
i,j ]
σ2H + γ
(6)
is the normalized correlation coefficient. When no attack (NA)
is performed we have
ρ(NA) =
σ2H
σ2H + γ
. (7)
Now, in the presence of an attack, we can consider the signal
transmitted by Eve as additional noise that will decrease
the correlation among the observed channels. If we indicate
with ρ(A) the normalized correlation coefficient, we will have
ρ(A) < ρ(NA), and from (5) the SK capacity of the resulting
channel will be reduced.
Assuming that Alice and Bob implement a SK agreement
procedure tailored to C(ρ(NA)), while the effective SK ca-
pacity is C(ρ(A)), by the strong converse [13], we conclude
that the probability that the two distilled keys are different is
asymptotically going to 1. Assuming an ideal key confirmation
procedure (i.e., error-free and non corrupted by Eve), we can
then conclude that the attack is always detected.
A. Attack Strategy with Partial CSI at Eve, Uncorrelated
Channels and Oblivious Alice
We now consider the case in which Eve knows her channel
to Alice and Bob (G1 and G2), however, we assume that she
does not know H , thus she has a partial CSI. Furthermore,
we assume that G1 and G2 are uncorrelated with H . Alice
and Bob are oblivious of Eve, and in particular they do not
know that Eve knows her own channels. In this case Eve can
precode pilots in the first phase by precoder G−12 Q and in
the second phase by precoder G−11 Q, where Q is any N ×N
matrix, so that the channel estimated by Alice and Bob is
always H(A) = H(B) = H+Q (plus noise). Therefore Alice
and Bob will distill the same key, and the key confirmation
procedure will confirm that this is the channel between the
two users.
Still, note that since Eve does not know the legitimate
channel H , she is not able to induce a specific channel4.
Therefore Q will be randomly chosen with iid zero-mean
entries having variance σ2Q. This choice will yield an observed
channel variance σ(A)2H = σ2Q + σ2H , thus providing the
correlation when PCA is performed by Eve
ρ(A) =
σ2H + σ
2
Q
σ2Q + σ
2
H + γ
> ρ(NA). (8)
Attack countermeasure: As a countermeasure to this
attack, Alice and Bob can check if the traces of H(A)H(A)H
and H(B)H(B)H are Nσ2H , i.e., these two conditions must
be satisfied (for N →∞)
trace(H(A)H(A)H) = N(σ2H + 1) (9a)
and
trace(H(B)H(B)H) = N(σ2H + 1) . (9b)
Clearly, when Eve performs the attack described above,
conditions (9) will not be satisfied, since by the independence
of Q with H we have
trace(H(B)H(B)H) =
trace(HHH) + trace(WWH) + trace(QQH) =
N(σ2H + 1 + σ
2
Q) > N(σ
2
H + 1) .
(10)
4For example, Eve cannot impose that the estimated channel by Alice and
Bob is the Alice-Eve channel, H(A) = H + Q = G1, which would be
the most advantageous situation for Eve, who would be able to access to all
forthcoming secret transmissions.
Note that this countermeasure requires that both Alice and
Bob know the channel statistics, in particular they must know
σ2H . The estimate of this parameter can be done by averaging
over a long time the channel estimate, assuming that other
conditions (such as path-loss) do not change and that Eve is
not transmitting over this time. Indeed, this countermeasure
has the same drawbacks as the approach in [9].
B. Attack Strategy with Partial CSI, Correlated Channels and
Oblivious Alice
Here we assume that G1 and G2 are correlated with H ,
and that Eve knows this statistic. Moreover, Eve knows the
realization of G1 and G2, but she does not know H , thus
having a partial CSI. In particular, by defining the column
vectors h, g1 and g2 obtained by vectorization of the columns
of H , G1 and G2, respectively, the correlation matrices are
K1 = E[g1h
H ] K2 = E[g2h
H ] R12 = E[g1g
H
2 ] (11)
R1 = R2 = E[g1g
H
1 ] = E[g2g
H
2 ] = σ
2
GIN2 . (12)
Alice and Bob ignore the knowledge by Eve. Therefore,
the SK agreement procedure is still be based on (5), using
as correlation factor ρ(NA) of (7). As we have seen from the
previous attack case, a successful attack must not decrease the
correlation coefficient ρ with respect to ρNA, and at the same
time it must satisfy trace constraints (9). Since Eve knows both
G1 and G2 she can precode pilots by G−12 Q and G
−1
1 Q in the
first and second phase, respectively. In this way, Alice and Bob
will estimate the same channel and therefore the correlation
among channels will be unaltered.
Now Q can be chosen on the basis of Eve’s knowledge
of the channel, and in order to pass the trace check (9). In
particular, let H(E) be the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate
of the channel H available at Eve, which under Gaussian
assumptions corresponds to the minimum mean square error
(MSE) estimator. Again, let us stack into the column vectors
h(E) and q the matrices H(E) and Q, respectively. Then
the vector x = [hT gT1 gT2 ]T is zero-mean Gaussian with
correlation matrix
R = E[xxH ] =

σ
2
HIN2 K
H
1 K
H
2
K1 σ
2
GIN2 K1K
H
2
K2 K2K
H
1 σ
2
GIN2

 . (13)
By defining
S = R−1 =

S11 S12 S13S21 S22 S23
S31 S32 S33

 (14)
the ML estimator at Eve is
h(E) = −[S−111 S12︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
g1 + S
−1
11 S13︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
g2] . (15)
The optimal attack strategy by Eve provides that she tries
to let both Alice and Bob estimate channel g1 instead of h, so
that Eve gets the most favorable channel conditions. Therefore
she will choose
q = −h(E) + αg1 , (16)
where α is a scaling factor chosen to satisfy the trace con-
straint. In particular, we impose
trace[(h+ q)(h + q)H ] =
N→∞
trace{E[(h+ q)(h + q)H ]}
= N2σ2H
(17)
where we have indicated the asymptotic behavior (N → ∞)
of the trace. Now we have (18) at the top of next page. By
the MSE orthogonality principle we have M2 = 0, therefore
(17) is satisfied with
α =
√
N2σ2H − trace(M1)
N
. (19)
Remark: We note that the derived Q provides also the
optimal attack when the SK procedure is not performed, but
the baseline channel estimation protocol described in Section
II is adopted. Indeed, the choice of Q as detailed improves
over the baseline attack (1).
C. Attack Strategy with Full Channel Knowledge and Oblivi-
ous Alice
Clearly, if Eve also knows the legitimate channel H , she can
replace it with any other channel, for example with channel
G1 by choosing
Q = G1 −H . (20)
This attack will go undetected, even when Alice and Bob
perform the trace check (9).
D. Further Attack Strategies
We indicate here two other possible attack scenarios, whose
analysis however is left for future study.
a) Attack Strategy with Partial CSI, Correlated Channels
and Conscious Legitimate Terminals: If Alice and Bob knows
about the presence of Eve and about the correlation matrices
K1 and K2, they can choose pilot signals that are in the null
spaces of the these correlation matrices and then estimate the
partial channel in the intersection between the two null spaces.
In this case Eve cannot interfere with the channel estimation
procedure by any mean. When no null space is available, or
the intersection between the two null spaces is empty Alice
and Bob can still obtain some advantage by precoding pilots
and estimating channels with different weight along different
direction.
b) Attacks Exploiting Common Exchange of Information:
Note that in the proposed solution the estimate of the legiti-
mate channel is not explicitly shared on the common channel.
Indeed, the SK extraction discloses something about the chan-
nel, however this is a very limited information. In principle,
Eve could perform multiple attacks by transmitting pilots
precoded with various precoding matrices Q. By analyzing
the information shared in public for the key agreement and
its variation according to the used precoding matrices she can
infer the actual channel H between Alice and Bob. Clearly
this attack requires time and advanced signal processing ca-
pabilities.
E[(h+ q)(h + q)H ] =E[hhH ] + E[hqH ] + E[qhH ] + E[qq)H ] =
σ2HIN2 + E[h((A+ αIN2)g1)
H + h(Bg2)
H ] + E[(A+ αIN2)g1h
H + (Bg2)h
H ]+
+ E[((A+ αIN2)g1 +Bg2)((A + αIN2)g1 +Bg2)
H ] =
= σ2HIN2 +K1(A
H + αIN2) +K2B
H + (A+ αIN2)K
H
1 +BK
H
2 +
+ (A+ σ2GαIN2)(A+ αIN2)
H + (A+ αIN2)R12B
H +BRH12(A+ αIN2)
H + σ2GBB
H =
= σ2HIN2 +K1A
H + αK1 +K2B
H +AKH1 + αK
H
1 +BK
H
2 +
+ σ2GAA+ αA + αA
H + α2IN2 +AR12B
H + αR12B
H + αBRH12 +BR
H
12A+ σ
2
GBB
H =
= [σ2HIN2 +K1A
H +K2B
H +AKH1 +BK
H
2 +AR12B
H + σ2GAA+BR
H
12A+ σ
2
GBB
H ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
M1
+
α [K1 +K
H
1 +A+A
H +R12B
H +BRH12]︸ ︷︷ ︸
M2
+α2IN2
(18)
E. Comparison with Other Solutions
As opposed to (the only few) previously proposed methods,
the proposed solution relies on pairing based on keys and
binary mappings rather than signal processing approaches [3],
[4], [5], [6] that may be prone to errors due to noise and
interference.
When we compare our solution with the technique of [5],
some considerations are in place. In [5] it is proposed that
Bob transmits two consecutive PSK-modulated blocks. The
first block is a training sequence, while the second comprises
random symbols. The attacker knows the training part but
not the random part, therefore it either sends other random
PSK symbols in the second block or it stays silent. In the
absence of the attacker, by correlating the two received blocks,
a PSK symbol must emerge. If the channel is contaminated,
no PSK symbol appears. Indeed in this case the overhead
with respect to our solution is reduced. Still, two observations
must be made: a) The phase information may be subject to
higher errors than the amplitude information (e.g., due to phase
noise), thus fully relying on the phase for security may not be
the best option when practical hardware is considered. b) Our
solution is based on solid information theoretic principles.
When compared to [6], our technique presents some ad-
vantages. In fact, [6] proposes that Bob transmits pilots to
Alice, then Alice beamforms to Bob with a gain such that
Bob sees an overall channel with predetermined value. The
attacker can jam the transmission from Alice to Bob, while
listening to the beamforming. As we assume that Eve has as
many antennas as Alice, it is then possible for the attacker to
know the beamformer used by Alice, thus knowing the channel
between Alice and Bob. Once this channel is known, as we
have seen, an attack that yields Alice and Bob to estimate G1
instead of H is possible. Our method overcomes this limitation
by not revealing the Alice-Bob channel to the attacker.
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Fig. 4. SOP as a function of the number of antennas N , for the case in
which Eve does not perform an attack (passive Eve) and the case in which
Eve transmits the same pilots of the legitimate transmitters, without precoding
(active Eve).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Focusing on a transmission with rate R0 of which RS < R0,
is the secret message rate, the SOP can be written as
Pout = P
[
R0 − log det(IN +G1BB
HGH1 ) < RS
] (21)
Note that (21) only provides the probability that Eve gets
some information about the secret message, and not that
Bob decodes the message (decodability outage event). For
the considered single user scenario we will assume that Alice
uses a beamformer to maximize the rate over Bob’s channel,
i.e., B = V D, where UΛV H = H(A) is the singular
value decomposition (SVD) of the estimated channel and
D is a diagonal matrix having on the diagonal the square
root of the water-filling solution of the channel SNRs given
by |[Λ]n,n|2, n = 1, . . . , N , under a total unitary power
constraint. Note that other beamforming solutions are possible,
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Fig. 5. SOP as a function of the correlation factor ζ , for the case in which
Eve does not perform an attack (passive Eve) and the case in which Eve
performs the attack reported in Section IV-B. N = 6 antennas.
and their optimization is left for future study.
We assume that channel H has iid Gaussian standard
entries, while channel G has zero-mean iid Gaussian entries
with power 0.5. We have chosen R0 = E[log det(IN +
HBBHHH)], under the assumption H(A) = H , and
RS = 0.2R0.
Before assessing the performance of the proposed method,
we motivate the need of a detection strategy by assessing the
SOP (21). Fig. 4 shows the SOP as a function of the number of
antennas N for the two cases where a) Eve is passive, and b)
Eve is active and transmits pilots with the same power of Bob.
No detection of pilot contamination is performed. We note that
an active attacker effectively increases the SOP, as expected.
Moreover, we note that as the number of antennas increases,
the SOP tends to zero, as it has been already observed [7].
We now focus on the case of Section IV-B, where Eve
knows channels to Alice and Bob and hence is able to pass the
SK procedure. However, she has only a statistical knowledge
of H , and channels G1 and G2 are correlated with H . Alice is
oblivious. As already observed in Section IV-B, in this special
scenario, an attack that is able to circumvent both the SK
procedure and the trace check is possible and the induced
channel Q that minimizes the MSE between the induced
channel and G1 has been obtained. Therefore, we assess for
this case the SOP. We assume that K1 = K2 = σ2GζIN2 ,
R12 = K1K
H
2 , σ
2
H = σ
2
G = 0.5, and N = 6 antennas. Fig. 5
shows the SOP as a function of ζ for three cases: a) a passive
Eve, b) and active Eve using the baseline attack (1), and c) an
active Eve using the attack (16). As expected, we observe that
as ζ increases, the SOP increases. Moreover, we observe that
both active attacks yield a higher SOP than when no attack
is performed. Lastly, we observe that indeed the choice of Q
according to (16) yields a further higher SOP with respect to
the baseline attack.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a technique to contrast the PCA in secure
MIMO systems, based on a key-confirmation procedure. The
proposed solution does not reveal the legitimate channel to the
adversary, and is effective in rejecting attacks in which the
attacker has uncorrelated channel observations with respect
to the legitimate channel. An analysis has been performed
for a variety of attacks, showing the vulnerabilities when the
attacker has access to channel realizations that are correlated
to the legitimate channel.
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